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Evaluative and deontic judgments play a practical role in our thought. Judging that
something is good, or right, or what we ought to do, ranks things in ways that guide
us towards the higher-ranked things. When I judge that I ought to eat more iron,
normally I reveal (or make) myself to be motivated or at least committed to eating
more iron, feeling bad if I don’t,  and so on. When we judge that we have most
reason to slow down climate change, this normally “stops the buck” in deliberation
and decision about what to do. It is controversial whether such a role in practical
reasoning  is  essential  to  the  evaluative  or  deontic  concepts  deployed  in  these
judgments. It is controversial to what extent “thick” concepts like  TACTFUL,  KIND,
and  CHASTE play such a practical role in our thought. And it is controversial just
what the practical role of a given normative concept is. But it is widely agreed that,
at minimum, descriptively “thin” normative concepts play some such practical role
for rational agents with a normal grasp of those concepts.1 Thin normative concepts
are, roughly, normative concepts which encode little descriptive information. They
are characteristically expressed by terms like good, right, and ought in English and
their equivalents in other languages. Call these ‘thin normative terms’.2 
 This is a preprint of a paper forthcoming in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 
(http://jesp.org). Please cite the official published version when available. 
1 I’ll use small capitals to denote concepts, single quotes to mention sentences, and double quotes 
for a variety of other uses of quote marks, such as mixture of use and mention, direct quotation, 
scare quotes, and introduction of theoretical notions. Italicized words denote lexical items. The 
use of italics for emphasis instead will be clear from the context. I use ‘normative’ to cover both 
the evaluative and the deontic. What I call a practical role is called “practical role” by Ridge 
(2014: 21), “normative role” by Eklund (2017: 9), and “guiding or regulative role” by Wedgwood
(2017: 15). The term ‘normative role’ may be misleading insofar as it may refer merely to how a 
normative concept is associated with other normative concepts – not my topic here. Finally, to 
keep things manageable, I’ll bracket epistemic judgments concerning what one ought to believe.
2 These terms have other uses as well. I assume we have a reasonably determinate grasp of which 
uses of these terms express thin normative concepts. What I say won’t hang on having a precise 
delineation of that class.
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This paper concerns how the practical role of normative thought is reflected
in  language.  Normative  language  manifests  a  parallel  phenomenon.  I  reveal  (or
make) myself to be motivated or committed to eating more iron no less when I assert
‘I ought to eat more iron’ than when I judge that I ought to eat more iron.  It is
natural  to  wonder  whether  the phenomenon is  semantic  or  pragmatic,  especially
since it may not be cleanly delineable in natural language. If the phenomenon were
specific to bare first-person assertions like ‘I ought to eat more iron’, there would be
little initial pressure to think it semantic.  Even if  normative assertions  in the first
person  are  important  to  understanding  normative  thought  or  its  relationship  to
action, it  doesn’t follow that  they are linguistically special.  And yet the standard
assumption in metaethics  is that at least thin normative terms are associated with
their practical role somehow as a matter of meaning.3 This assumption is usually
implicit and rarely articulated precisely. But it faces a serious problem in any form.
As  we’ll  see,  terms  like  ought and  good often  figure  in  assertions  where  their
customary practical role is absent. Such cases pose a challenge: either offer some
plausible explanation of why the relevant practical  upshots don’t show up in these
cases despite featuring in our overall semantic theory for these expressions, or else
don’t build them into  such a theory. I’ll argue that existing accounts of normative
language  have  no adequate  explanation  of  how  the  association  between  thin
normative terms and practical  role  can  be broadly  semantic  and yet  tolerate  the
exceptions  I’ll  highlight.  In  closing  I’ll  consider  the  prospects  of  a  pragmatic
account  of  the  phenomenon.  This  is  an  option  to  take  seriously  because
generalizations that don’t rise to the level of full generality are normally more apt to
be explained in pragmatics.
My enterprise is hermeneutic: it concerns how the association between thin
normative terms and their practical roles is in fact reflected in natural language. This
gives  the  issues  at  stake  and  my  arguments  significant  broader  interest  and
importance. If the association between thin normative terms and practical role isn’t
broadly semantic,  this  puts significant  pressure on standard forms of metaethical
expressivism and inferentialism. For expressivists typically account for the meaning
of normative language in terms of practical states of mind, such as plans, desires, or
sentiments.  And  inferentialists  typically  account  for  the  meaning  of  normative
language in terms of practical commitments to not only think but also act and feel in
3 Strandberg (2012) and Finlay (2014) are exceptions; see §6.1. My argument will be more general
than theirs.
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certain ways.  Existing accounts  of  neither  sort  have an adequate solution to  the
challenge I’ll raise.  If the association between thin normative terms and practical
role isn’t broadly semantic, this will also suggest certain general lessons about how
normative thought and language relate. For instance, our normative discourse can be
in perfectly good working order without containing predicates that are associated
with  certain  practical  roles  in  any  broadly  semantic  way.  Even  if  there  are
distinctively practical OUGHT-concepts that are conceptually or constitutively linked
to certain practical upshots, we have reason to doubt that this link will be encoded in
the correct overall  semantic theory for natural  languages.  Such concepts may be
privileged in normative theory, but not in our overall semantic theory for normative
language.  We might  then  also  wonder  how crucial  such  concepts  really  are  for
normative thought. Philosophers of normativity will therefore need to think more
carefully about the relation between normative thought and normative talk. 
2. Semantic Views of the Practical Role of Normative Discourse
One  of  the  few  widely  shared  convictions  among  moral  philosophers  is  that
normative  judgments  play  a  distinctive  role  in  our  practical  thinking.  We  may
disagree about just what the practical role of a given normative concept is  and be
unable to state it in uncontroversial  terms.  But we have some grasp of the notion,
since  we  routinely  compare  the  practical  roles  of  different  normative  concepts
(Eklund 2017:  45-46).  For  instance,  moral  evaluation  is  different  from aesthetic
evaluation, and the practical role of  CHASTE is different from that of  RIGHT.  Some
normative concepts may even be individuated, at least in part, by their practical role.
I  won’t  deny  that  people  can  have  such  concepts.4 But  don’t  words  express
concepts? So if there were distinctively practical concepts, wouldn’t it then be part
of the meaning of the words that express these concepts to have this connection to
practical  role?  Sincere  moral  claims  by  rational  agents,  for  instance,  are  often
thought not to tolerate the absence of corresponding practical upshots. This line of
thought  might  also  help  distinguish  normative  terms  (and  not  just  normative
concepts)  from  non-normative  terms.  What  could  the  difference  be,  if  not  that
something about the meaning of normative terms connects them to a practical role? 
4 Whether analyzing the nature of normative concepts in terms of their practical point would yield 
any substantive results is a further question. For a cautionary discussion, see Sharadin and van 
Someren Greve (2021).
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This is all too quick. If words express concepts, it doesn’t follow that those
concepts directly determine the meaning of those words. In the normative case, the
following is possible, for instance: (i) if a concept plays a role R for a thinker, then it
picks out moral rightness but (ii) the word right isn’t constrained by the rules of the
language to stand  only for such a concept.  In other contexts, it  might be used to
express concepts  that  lack a practical role, such as what is right according to my
parish priest.  So even if  some normative concepts are essentially associated with
certain  practical  roles,  it  doesn’t  follow  that  this  connection  is  reflected  in  the
meanings of the words used to express those concepts. In general, linguistic meaning
and mental content might not line up in any neat way (cf. Yalcin 2014;  Glanzberg
2018). It remains similarly open whether what makes normative discourse different
from non-normative discourse is how their meanings relate to some distinctive kind
of practical import.
What  might  it  be  for  thin  normative  terms  to  be  associated  with  their
practical roles as a matter of meaning? Our overall theory of meaningful linguistic
communication is normally taken to have three main parts (whose boundaries may
not be sharp):  descriptive semantics, metasemantics, and pragmatics.  When  I ask
whether  the  practical  role  of  thin  normative  terms  is  a  “broadly  semantic”
phenomenon that holds “as a matter of meaning” and is to figure  in our “overall
semantic theory”, the question is whether the phenomenon is a descriptive-semantic
or metasemantic  rather than pragmatic  phenomenon. A pragmatic account  would
take an account of the meaning of a  normative  sentence and say that the relevant
practical upshots are some further kind of information which may be conveyed by
its  utterances, given  its  meaning  and  the  context:  conversational  implicature,
pragmatic presupposition, or the like. 
On descriptive-semantic  accounts,  the  association  between thin normative
terms and practical role would be a feature of assignments of semantic value to thin
normative terms. The term ‘semantic value’ is a neutral term for the things which,
according to a semantic theory, “provide the interpretations of simple expressions
and are the arguments and values of the functions defined by the compositional rules
that interpret the complex expressions” (Stalnaker 1997:  535).  I’ll take descriptive
semantics to include an account of the lexical properties of simple expressions and
other conventional aspects of their meaning in a language, since these will constrain
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assignments of semantic value.5 (For context-sensitive expressions, context provides
further constraints.) So, for instance, if the practical  role of  ought were a lexical
property of the word, it would be a descriptive-semantic phenomenon. Assignments
of semantic value to expressions by a theory are supposed to account for  features
like  the  entailments  licensed  by  the  expressions  and  the truth-conditions  of  the
sentences they compose.6 
On metasemantic accounts, the association between thin normative terms and
practical role would instead be a feature of that in virtue of which thin normative
terms  have the  semantic  values  they  do.  Metasemantics  (sometimes  called
“foundational semantics”) is about “what  the facts are  that  give expressions their
semantic values, or more generally, about what makes it the case that the language
spoken  by  a  particular  individual  or  community  has  a  particular  descriptive
semantics” (Stalnaker 1997: 535). It involves explaining both why expressions have
the context-invariant descriptive-semantic features they do and what it is about the
situation, behavior, or the mental states of the speaker that makes it the case that a
context-sensitive expression has the contextually determined semantic value it does.
For instance, if the semantic value of ought were determined by its inferential role
and its inferential role were  essentially  practical,  then the practical role of  ought
would be a metasemantic phenomenon (see §5.4). 
Canonical statements of semantic or metasemantic accounts of the practical
role  of  normative  discourse  are  hard  to  find.  But  there  are  suggestions  in  the
ballpark. Hare thinks that the “primary meaning” of  ought is “prescriptive” –  one
that, by Hare’s stipulation, entails an imperative (Hare 1952: 159, 164). Similarly,
the  primary  meaning  of  good  is an  evaluative  meaning  that  entails  a
recommendation. This, he thinks, is what anchors meaningful connections between
the applications of these terms to very different sorts of things by different people.
(Consider  the example of the missionary and the cannibals in Hare 1952: 148-9.)
5 Conventional aspects of meaning are (very roughly) relatively arbitrary regularities of a 
population using a certain linguistic form (e.g. a word or a sentence) to mean a certain thing. 
(Conventions are arbitrary in that no general account than a historical one is available for them.) 
For a discussion of various complications, including that conventionality may have multiple 
dimensions and come in degrees, see Simons and Zollman (2019). 
6 The dominant approach to semantics in this sense is truth-conditional semantics: the semantic 
value of a sentence just is its truth-conditions, and the semantic value of an expression is the 
contribution it makes to the truth conditions of the sentences in which it features. But of course 
there are alternatives. Expressions may also have various non-compositional conventional 
features. Here I’ll have to bracket views on which moral claims play a practical role via 
conventional implicature (Copp 2001) or semantic presupposition.
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Dreier’s “speaker relativism” analyzes ‘x is good’ as meaning ‘x is approved of by
M’, where M is a contextually specified moral system. He takes it to be built “into
the very semantics of moral terms” that M is picked out in part by certain kinds of
motivational  and  affective  factors  (Dreier  1990:  6,  23-4).  Blackburn  writes  that
“since  moralizing  and  valuing  are  distinctive  activities,  the  words  we  use  to
communicate our morals and our values will have their distinctive meanings” and
that capturing the way that ethics is “essentially practical” requires “showing how
[ethical]  judgment  has  a  content  or  truth-condition  that  is  itself  magnetic”
(Blackburn 1998: 87, 115). Wedgwood proposes that the meaning of good and ought
each is given by the basic rules of rationality governing its use, where these rules
concern commitments to certain preferences or planning states (Wedgwood 2001;
2007: ch. 4). According to Gibbard, the meaning of ought is explained by its tie to
planning  states;  “plan-laden  concepts”  have  “much  to  do”  with  what  ordinary
normative terms like ought express (Gibbard 2003: 139). These proposals all affirm
a connection between what thin normative terms mean and some kind of practical
role. As we’ll see, they share a significant assumption. But they resist summary into
a single hypothesis. 
One respect in which these proposals differ concerns what kind of thing the
practical role of normative language is. Some focus on practical dispositions: at least
all else equal, judging that one ought to φ in circumstances C (etc.) tends to motivate
one to φ in C, or to close deliberation about whether to φ, or the like. Perhaps one
will also tend to feel guilt if one doesn’t φ or resent or blame others if they don’t φ
in relevantly similar circumstances. Others focus on practical commitments: judging
that one ought to φ in C (etc.) commits one to thinking, feeling, or acting in certain
ways with respect to φ, such as perhaps forming the intention to φ in C, or making
φ-ing in C part of one’s ideal plan about what to do. Perhaps it also commits one to
disapproving, resenting, or blaming those who don’t φ in C, and so on.7 Of course, it
might be that the practical role of some normative terms involves motivations while
7 Practical commitments differ from various species of theoretical commitment. They aren’t 
merely intranormative. Judging that I (morally, legally, etc.) ought to φ in C might commit me to 
thinking there is (moral, legal, etc.) reason for me to φ in C. Whether this commits me to acting, 
feeling, or thinking on the basis of those reasons is a further question. Nor can these 
commitments be merely alethic or doxastic. If I judge that a measure of voting intention is 
unreliable, I commit myself to the truth of that proposition, but not any intention or sentiment. 
The same goes for the commitment to believe q generated by judging that p and believing that 
p→ q. Practical commitments are more like the following: if I promise that I’ll be a better parent,
I commit to being a better parent in the future, and the same goes if I endorse the thought that I 
shall be a better parent. 
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that  of some others involves commitments,  and the practical role  of  some terms
might involve both. In what follows I’ll mainly talk of practical commitments, since
this is a logically weaker notion. Affirming a practical commitment requires less of
an agent than having a matching disposition to comply.8 
Another respect in which the proposals  noted above  differ concerns what
kind of connection is supposed to obtain between  thin  normative  terms and  their
practical role. Hare and Blackburn  seem to  make claims in descriptive semantics.
Dreier,  Gibbard,  and Wedgwood seem to have in mind metasemantic  views. But
they all  seem to  imply that  thin normative terms’ association with their  practical
roles is some indispensable feature of their meaning which any competent user of
these expressions must master.9 This is a useful starting point; it’ll help to articulate
a problem which any broadly semantic view must address somehow or other. 
3. The Problem of Diverse Uses
I’ll now argue that thin normative terms are often used sincerely and felicitously to
state requirements or recommendations in ways that don’t commit the speaker to
thinking, feeling, or acting in accordance with those verdicts.10 If the practical role of
these terms were a  part of their  conventional  profile in a language, it shouldn’t be
subject to such exceptions but instead should be present in all literal uses in normal
contexts.11 This  raises  what  I’ll  call  the  Problem of  Diverse  Uses:  how do you
reconcile the diversity of uses to which thin normative terms may be put with the
claim that  their  association  with  their  normative  roles  is  broadly  semantic?  The
problem prompts a challenge: either offer some plausible explanation of cases where
the relevant practical upshots are absent which reconciles these claims, or else don’t
8 Either kind of practical role is richer if some form of internalism about it is true, such as 
motivational internalism about normative judgment. Each is distinct from Klimczyk’s (2020) idea
of “authored practicality”. 
9 In due course I’ll ask whether all broadly semantic views carry this implication in full. Some 
recent metasemantics for normative discourse might not. These include Ridge (2014), Chrisman 
(2015, 2018), Köhler (2018), Bedke (2019), and Tiefensee (2016, 2021). I’ll discuss Ridge, 
Chrisman, and Tiefensee in §§5.3-5.4.  
10 As the examples below make clear, I’m not talking about sentences like ‘Martha says I ought to 
tell the truth’, ‘Either I ought to tell the truth or it is not the case that I ought to tell the truth’, or 
the embedding of thin normative terms under negation or possibility modals like might, or in the 
antecedent of a conditional. 
11 This holds irrespective of whether practical upshots are features of propositions speakers 
communicate when making claims using normative terms, or of acts of making such claims, such
as their propriety conditions. An example of the latter kind of view would be the ethical neo-
expressivism of Bar-On and Chrisman (2009).
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build such upshots into our overall semantic theory for thin normative terms. I’ll be
driving us to the latter option. 
One sort of evidence for the relevant kind of diversity of uses is that any
suggestion of practical commitment is absent in cases like (1)-(2):
(1) One ought to prioritize profit over fairness. But is that really the thing
to do?
(2) a. [Client:] What is my legal obligation, and what do you expect me
to do?
b. [Lawyer:] You have to report your liability, but I don’t know if you
will; you may prefer to push the limits of the law and just conceal it.
(Mandelkern 2021: 43.)
Claims  like  (1)  can  make  perfectly  good sense  in  conversations  about  capitalist
worldviews. The corresponding interpretation of ought need only be implicit in the
context for the overt utterance to sound coherent. Variants of (1)-(2) arise by varying
the modal verbs: ought for have to, and so on.12 The point of these examples is that
practical  commitments don’t  result  conventionally from using  wrong or  ought  to
state requirements or recommendations. Conventional features of utterances aren’t
as easily defeasible as the absence of practical upshots in (1)-(2) would require. 
One might claim that  (1)-(2) are insufficient  to  show  that  the association
between  thin  terms  and  practical  role  isn’t  semantic.  Perhaps  not  all  sincere
assertions of thin normative claims in normal contexts must carry practical upshots
for such association to be a broadly semantic matter. For instance, the phenomenon
seems clearest in bare first-person uses, but (1)-(2) aren’t such cases. However, there
is no  general  reason  why  a  difference  in  personal  pronoun  should  make  this
particular kind of semantic difference. Moreover, practical upshots are absent also in
some bare first-person assertions.  To many people’s ears, sincere assertions of (3)-
(4)  are  indicative  of  a substantive  normative  mistake rather  than  linguistic
incompetence:
(3) I would be wrong to kill. But I’m okay with killing and don’t feel bad
about it.
12 See e.g. Silk (2016: 40): ‘Ernie ought to be home by 10. Aren’t his parents stupid? I’d stay out if 
I were him.’
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(4) I  ought  to finish grading.  I  have absolutely no intention to  do so,
though.13
If a sincere assertion of ‘I ought to finish grading’ always committed you to planning
to do the thing, then asserting it while also rejecting such plans, as in (4), should
induce a strong feeling of incoherence. But it needn’t. Even if  wrong and ought in
many contexts express concepts whose application  is practically committal in this
way, instances of (3)-(4) needn’t express such concepts. The first half of (4) would
often express something more like a role obligation.  
So  (3)-(4)  are  evidence  that  a  practical  commitment  doesn’t  result
conventionally  even  from  first-person  assertive  utterances  of  lexical  items like
wrong and ought.  Similar evidence comes from psychologically realistic characters
who take delight in evil for evil’s sake, are committed to sheer malignity under that
description, and so on. When Iago sincerely identifies his conduct as demonic, he is
specifying a feature of his conduct which he is committed to pursuing and strongly
inclines him to engage in the conduct (cf. Kramer 2019).  Further first-person cases
where practical commitment is absent include (5)-(6):
(5) I should do the shopping today (as far as I know).14
(6) a. [CEO:] What is our legal obligation, and what we should we do?
b. [Head of Legal:] We have to report our liability, but could decide to
push the limits of the law and just conceal it. 
In (5) the speaker states a normative requirement that follows (as far as she knows)
from  her  household’s  shopping  arrangements.  Her  commitments  to  responding
accordingly are simply a further issue. (6) reminds us that not all first-person uses
are  singular.  A special  convention  for  bare  singular  first-person  present-tense
assertions is all the less likely, and wouldn’t in any case be a conventional aspect of
the meaning of thin normative terms themselves. 
13 Woods (2014) discusses these kinds of examples in the context of expressivism. Ruiz and 
Stojanovic (2019: 159-163) suggest that such examples need a contrasting connective like but 
and this is evidence that if a rational and sincere speaker says something positive about an object,
she normally expresses a certain practical stance. I can agree, but would deny (in part for reasons 
I’ll mention in §6.1 below) that this tells us as much about the meaning of normative terms as 
they take it to do. 
14 I adapt (5) from a second-person example in Kaufmann (2012: 58).
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(1)-(6) illustrate that thin normative terms are often used non-committally, to
state  normative  verdicts  in  ways  that  don’t  carry  corresponding  practical
commitments.15 My sample theorists acknowledge some such cases.16 Hare says that
ought and good can have “secondary” descriptive meanings. Dreier, Blackburn, and
Gibbard allow that even sincere first-person  ought-statements don’t always imply
that the speaker is in a corresponding conative state.  But none is very clear about
just  how  thin  normative  terms’ association  with  their  practical  role  can  allow
exceptions  and  yet  be  a  broadly  semantic  phenomenon.17 (I’ll  extract  some
suggestions shortly.)  Examples like (1)-(6) imply that such an association  isn’t the
sort  of  conventional  matter  that  these views take it  to  be.18 Similarly,  insofar  as
assertive  uses of thin normative terms carry directive or commissive illocutionary
force, such force won’t derive from their lexical meaning. 
15 Some readers might be wondering about uses of normative terms to express imperatives. On the 
relationship between strong necessity modals like must and have to and imperatives, see e.g. 
Ninan (2005), Kaufmann (2012: §2.3.1), and Mandelkern (2021). Some of my examples suggest 
that these modals don’t always (even in their deontic uses) express orders or commands. 
Although my focus isn’t on orders or commands, it is worth noting that the performative element 
of an order (its inducement for the addressee to change the world in some way) might be a kind 
of pragmatic meaning. Kaufmann argues that imperatives (‘Close the door!’) are modalized 
declaratives (‘You must/should close the door’) which come with presuppositional ingredients 
that constrain them to usage in contexts in which the modalized declarative would achieve a non-
assertoric, performative effect (Kaufmann 2012: 63, 132). The pressure to act which imperatives 
often induce on their addressees is located in certain pragmatic presuppositions that govern their 
felicitous use, not in an explanation of their meaning (Kaufmann 2012: 144-63). However, the 
debates about imperatives is ongoing.
16 In Wedgwood, this is implicit. His account is officially limited to a certain “deliberative” concept
that ought can be used to express (2007: 97). He doesn’t say how to generalize his analysis so 
that it would account for the meaning of ought, given the many other deontic concepts which the 
word can be used to express.  
17 Hare, Blackburn, and Gibbard describe uses of ought for which they take motivational 
internalism to be a conceptual truth. But ought can be used in deontic contexts to express 
normative concepts for which motivational internalism doesn’t hold. Dreier analyzes ‘x is good’ 
as meaning ‘x is approved of by M’, where M is a contextually specified moral system. 
According to him, it is built into the meaning of good that M is chosen from the context by 
balancing the content and subject matter of a set of rules and those rules’ motivational and 
affective connections with the speaker (Dreier 1990: 24-5). But the meanings of these terms don’t
require us to interpret (1)-(6) by considering what rules have such connections. (Also, good has 
other than moral uses.)
18 My arguments allow that to understand the lexical meaning of a word, we may have to look at a 
group of semantically related words, such as may, must, and have to in the case of ought. How 
concepts relate in general to lexical meaning is a more complex issue to which I cannot do 
justice; Glanzberg (2018) is a rich discussion. 
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4. Diverse Uses and Descriptive Semantics
Any account of the diverse uses of thin normative terms which we have observed
will take one of two forms. Practically committal and non-committal uses of thin
normative terms either have a uniform descriptive semantics, or they don’t. These
are the options whether or not their practical role is a broadly semantic phenomenon.
It’ll be instructive to begin by considering why some simple broadly semantic views
of each type fail to solve the Problem of Diverse Uses. 
One proposal that posits semantic uniformity says that deontic uses of terms
like  ought affirm the practical commitments of some agent or other. The thought
might  be that  committal  uses  convey the speaker’s  own commitments,  and non-
committal uses play the relevant practical role indirectly by committing the speaker
to thinking or feeling in a certain way in such-and-such a contingency (cf. Gibbard
2003; Ridge 2014: 19). But this won’t do. To interpret the deontic content of ‘We
ought to report our liability, but could decide to push the limits of the law and just
conceal  it’ in  (6),  we  needn’t  suppose  that  the  Head  of  Legal  is  committed  to
reporting the liability in the case where the firm decides not to push the limits of the
law. Or consider a value system which a science fiction author just invented. There
is no pressure to interpret the ought-claims that describe that value system’s verdicts
as expressing the practical commitments of the members of  this culture.  In such
cases,  the relevant  agent  could only be specified as “someone who endorses the
norms at issue”. In general, we understand thin normative claims so long as we can
identify the relevant standards: a capitalist value system in (1), the local legal code
in (2) and (6), and so on. Stating the recommendations of a standard doesn’t require
assumptions regarding who if anyone is committed to those standards. And while
such recommendations  can  always  be  represented  by a  preference  ordering,  this
doesn’t require preferences to encode motivations or commitments. They need only
function as abstract ranking devices. 
A correspondingly  simple  proposal  without semantic  uniformity  is  that
although non-committal uses of thin normative terms don’t directly convey practical
commitments, these uses are ultimately to be explained by reference to committal
uses.  A proposal  that is familiar from other contexts is to analyze non-committal
uses as parasitic on committal uses. They might be claimed to report or otherwise
allude to  other  people’s  committal  normative judgments  (cf.  Hare 1952: 124-26,
164-65;  Blackburn  1998:  59-68,  110).  However,  this  solution  undergeneralizes.
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Normative  language  can  be  used  make  non-committed  statements  about  what
follows from some normative system which have never occurred to anyone before
(Raz 1980: 235). 
A different strategy that implies lack of semantic uniformity is to argue that
cases where the relevant practical upshots are present and absent are distinguished
by  linguistic  convention  after  all.  One  view  is  that  thin  normative  terms  have
multiple distinct but related meanings. It is controversial whether modal expressions
like  ought are polysemous  across different flavors of modality, such as epistemic,
deontic, and dynamic.19 But examples (1)-(6) all concern ought in deontic contexts.
It is much less common to think that the flexibility of modal expressions within a
modal flavor is due to polysemy, rather than context-sensitivity (on which more in
§5).20 Features of a mere subset of uses of deontic expressions aren’t evidence about
their meaning. 
A more sophisticated version of this strategy is to claim that deontic claims
which don’t play a practical role aren’t genuinely normative claims, and so deontic
terms aren’t  used normatively  in  (1)-(6).  What  ‘normative’ means in  the  talk  of
normative terms and claims is an infamously fraught issue (Finlay 2019). The notion
of the “genuinely” normative also requires explication. But interpreting ‘normative’
to include only the genuinely normative is unduly narrow for the present purposes in
any case.  Suppose the sense in  which a  sentence like ‘One ought  to  do that’ is
normative only  applies  to  uses  which  essentially  involve  practical  commitments.
This class of “normative” sentences would exclude many uses of ought which also
19 The dominant tradition in the semantics of modals, developing the framework in (Kratzer 1981; 
1991), aims to give a unified semantics of deontic, epistemic, and other flavors of modality. 
Viebahn and Vetter (2016) argue that each modal expression has distinct but systematically 
related meanings, for different modal flavors, while their flexibility within each modal flavor is 
due to context-sensitivity. This is compatible with my arguments. Even if the lexical entry for 
ought includes a variable whose different values give ought an epistemic, deontic, or goal-
oriented flavor, the practical role of deontic ought doesn’t have a comparable status. See §5.2.
20 See also Kaufmann (2012: 60-62), who uses polysemy avoidance to make a case for a uniform 
semantics for descriptive and performative modal verbs. There is a debate in metaethics about 
whether ought is polysemous between a “practical”/“deliberative” sense and an “evaluative” 
sense (Schroeder 2011; Finlay and Snedegar 2014; Chrisman 2015: 124-33). But the distinctions 
cited in that debate differ from those on the table here. Perhaps the deliberative ought is always 
indexed to a particular agent and time (Wedgwood 2007: 90). But ought can be so indexed when 
it is used to state what follows from some assumed standard for some other agent’s situation at a 
given time. Or perhaps the deliberative ought “matters directly for advice” and “is the right kind 
of thing to close deliberation” (Schroeder 2011: 17). But an ought-claim describing what follows 
from a set of standards can constitute advice which is suitable for closing deliberation without the
relevant practical commitments being in place; recall (2) and (6). (Cf. Bronfman and Dowell 
2018: 107-8.) 
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are  distinctive  from  typical  uses  of  paradigmatically  descriptive,  non-normative
words like tree or tall.21 The deontic claims in (1)-(6) are normative in the broader
sense that they concern standards falling short  of which opens one up to certain
kinds of criticism – legal standards in the case of (2) and (6), and so on. Even if both
‘I ought to finish grading’ (as asserted in the context of (4)) and ‘Matt is tall’ are
descriptive in one sense, the implications of falling short of the standards invoked by
(4) are different from those of falling short of the contextually supplied standards of
tallness. The lack of practical upshot may mean that (1)-(6) express requirements
whose normativity  is merely “formal” rather than “substantive” or “authoritative”.
But  these cases  show that  one  function  of  these words  in  English is  to  express
formally  normative  claims.  So the  sense  of  ‘normative’ that  is  relevant  to  our
semantic theory for expressions like  good and  ought had better include also such
formal normativity. 
We could instead seek progress by characterizing the different uses to which
normative  terms  may  be  put.  We  distinguish  “engaged”  or “committal”  and
“detached” or “non-committal” uses of normative language (Raz 1980: 234-35 and
above). We  might  gloss  this  further  by  saying  that  normative  terms  have  non-
committal uses that state  requirements or recommendations that follow from some
assumed  body  of  standards,  and  committal  uses  that  somehow  (semantically  or
pragmatically) also convey corresponding practical commitments. One proposed test
is that a use is at least normally non-committal if the relevant utterance is reasonably
interpreted as if it contained an implicit according to-type phrase.22 This is a fallible
test. When the doorman says to me ‘According to the rules of our club, patrons may
not wear sneakers’, this isn’t a merely descriptive use. The doorman is committed to
not letting me in. But we recognize the distinction, however particular cases fall with
respect to it.  (In this example,  the practical upshot of the doorman’s utterance is
clearly a kind of pragmatic meaning.) 
It  is  one thing to  grant  this  distinction  of uses  of normative terms, quite
another to claim that it is  somehow marked by linguistic convention  or  otherwise
21 The more narrowly we understand ‘normative’, the less clear it is that there strictly speaking are 
normative words or sentences in English. There may just be words and sentences which can be 
used normatively (in the various senses of ‘normative’) or non-normatively without changing 
meaning. Alwood (2016: 15) makes this point about the notion of ‘normative’ in Ridge (2014). 
I’ll discuss Ridge’s view in §5.3.  
22 Cf. Silk (2016: 130-32) and Chrisman (2018: 412). Ruiz and Stojanovic (2019) propose various 
other criteria for distinguishing “expressive” and “factual” uses of terms. Not all of these, 
however, seem likely to carry over. 
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drawn in our semantic theory for normative terms. I see little reason to suppose that
the distinction between committal and non-committal uses of terms like ought and
good has such a status.  The distinction doesn’t  involve a  difference in linguistic
form, whereas linguistic conventions pair forms with meanings. So even if there are
complex regularities regarding when an assertion of ‘I ought to finish grading’ is
committal  and when it  is  non-committal,  it  isn’t  at  all  clear  how they could be
candidates for linguistic convention.23 Whether an assertive use of ‘I ought to finish
grading’ is committal or non-committal is a function of features of the context of
utterance which don’t normally ground linguistic convention. The distinction looks
more apt for speakers to track by means of their world knowledge and pragmatic
reasoning. Nor are there clear analogues in other segments of natural language. For
instance, to be a competent user of ‘tummy’ in English, I need to grasp not only that
it denotes stomachs but also that it  belongs to infant-directed speech; ‘tummy’ is
unsuitable by virtue of its meaning for me to use at a gastroenterologist’s (Ferguson
1964).  The  difference  between  committal  and  non-committal  uses  of  normative
language isn’t this kind of conventionalized difference in register. Although I will be
a fair target of criticism if I assert ‘I ought to do that’ in a seemingly committal way
without being practically committed in the relevant ways, my  faux pas (or, rather,
lack of any pas) is just a special case of violating a general sincerity condition on
speech acts, nothing specific to normative language. 
It doesn’t help the case to claim that committal uses express concepts that are
crucial to a certain kind of practical thought. For instance, if non-committal uses of
normative sentences just  update our picture of what is to be done relative to some
standard,  their  acceptance  needn’t  involve  more  than  recognizing  those  verdicts.
Even  if  the  acceptance  of  a  normative  sentence  involves  more  in  other  cases,
features  specific  to  those  uses  aren’t  evidence  about  the  meanings  of  normative
terms (contrary to Gibbard 2003: 153). There is also no systematic link between
whether ought is used committally or non-committally and what kind of normativity
it is used to express. People can get very committed about what they should do by
the formally  normative standards  of  feline excitement  or  espresso excellence.  In
sum:  to  solve  the  Problem  of  Diverse  Uses,  it  isn’t  enough  just  to  distinguish
committal and non-committal uses of normative terms.
23 For a useful exercise, compare how different this case is from whether indirect speech acts (such 
as using ‘Can you pass the salt?’ to issue a request) are conventional. See especially Simons and 
Zollman (2019: 13-22).
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What  I  take  my  discussion  so  far  most  strongly  to  suggest  is  that  thin
normative terms’ association with their practical role is unlikely to be a phenomenon
at the level of descriptive semantics. In that case we should expect committal and
non-committal  uses  of  thin  normative  terms  to  be  uniform  in  their  descriptive
semantics. This is dialectically significant. For if the relevant practical upshots are
absent in many contexts, then semantic uniformity would be easy to explain if the
presence  of  practical  upshots  in  other  contexts  weren’t  a  broadly  semantic
phenomenon. The pressure is therefore on for the alternative broadly semantic view
that  thin normative terms’ association with their  practical  role is  a  metasemantic
phenomenon instead. 
5. Practical Role and the Metasemantics of Ought
To assess the metasemantic view, we require some idea of what kind of descriptive
semantics thin normative terms have.  I’ll  use as my sample  the standard sort  of
descriptive  semantics  for  deontic  modal  expressions  in  English.  I’ll  argue  that
nothing in this formal semantics or plausible supplementary assumptions supports
treating those uses of deontic terms which are associated with a practical role as
semantically or metasemantically exceptional. 
5.1. The Standard Semantics for Deontic Modals
The dominant  view in linguistics and philosophy of language is  that  expressions
such  as ought/must/should/have  to/… are  context-sensitive  modal  operators.  For
instance,  in  Ought(p),  ought is  a  non-propositional  device  for  shifting  the
circumstances  relative  to  which  p is  to  be  semantically  evaluated  at  a  world  of
evaluation w. Relative to w, ‘I eat more iron’ might be false but ‘I ought to eat more
iron’ true. On the account due to Kratzer which is the starting point for many further
developments,  ought determines  the  set  of  worlds  relevant  to  modeling  those
circumstances along two contextual parameters (Kratzer 1981; 1991). Intuitively, the
first is which worlds matter, the second is how we rank them. In the terminology of
the  theory,  the  first  is  a  modal  base:  a  function  f from  w  to  a  set  of  worlds
compatible with  w. This is a restriction on  w by whatever background conditions
may be  selected  as  relevant  in  context  c.24 The  second is  an  ordering  source:  a
24 The relevant notion of context here includes both linguistic elements (such as previous utterances
and topics of conversation) and extralinguistic elements (such as the intentions of the speaker, 
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function g from w to the set of best worlds in the modal base. This yields an ordering
over worlds in terms of whichever standards are selected in c. Then “fg-compatible
worlds” will be the set of best worlds determined by c and w. 
The semantic value of Ought(p) relative to a context-world pair can now be
represented by the following modal rule:
[[Ought(p)]]fg is true iff all of the fg-compatible worlds are p-worlds.25
For instance, suppose that ‘You ought to abstain from premarital sex’ is uttered when
the question is what it takes to live a Roman Catholic life. The modal rule for ought
then tells us that the sentence is true just in case you abstain from premarital sex in
all worlds that are compatible with something like the following two restrictions.
First, a restriction to worlds in which you can engage in premarital sex (f). Second, a
restriction of those worlds to ones that rank highly  by Roman Catholic values (g).
Interpreted relative to this context, the sentence is, plausibly, true. But now take a
different context where  the question is  what it takes to live a life of high sensory
pleasure. Interpreted relative to this context, the sentence is, plausibly, false.  The
modal  rule  allows ought to be  interpreted  relative  to  any  ordering  with  certain
formal  properties:  how  well  something  conforms with the  1911  Boy  Scouts
Handbook; how excited my cat gets; what is better for a given agent; what is likely
to happen anyway (normative fatalism is a thing for some); the standards endorsed
by the speaker; some specific moral ideal; the most fundamental moral standards
(whatever they may be); or whatever standard (objective or otherwise) is expressed
in  ‘I  know I  morally  ought  to  φ,  but  ought  I  really  to  φ?’26 This  captures  our
recognition that nearly anything can be felicitously called by terms like ought. 
objects discernible in the environment, the social setting, and common presuppositions). 
25 This formulation is from Chrisman (2018: 410). Double brackets stand for a function that maps a 
linguistic expression to its semantic value. My main points will go through even if ought needn’t 
order possible worlds (Ridge 2014: 33-35). I suspect they’ll also go through even if the Kratzer 
semantics is replaced by one that connects deontic modals to verdicts of a theory practical 
rationality, e.g. in ways proposed by Cariani (2016), Charlow (2016), or Lassiter (2016). For 
these accounts appeal just to formal decision-theoretic constraints on the ranking of options. 
Issues about deontic logic raised by Broome (2016: 11-13) may be more tricky. See also 
Bronfman and Dowell (2018) for responses to various challenges to Kratzer-style semantics for 
deontic modals.
26 As Worsnip (2019) puts it, the contextually selected standards needn’t be “parochial” but can be 
“aspirational”. As these examples suggest, standards needn’t be reified, they may lack handy 
natural language labels, and their contents may not be immediately obvious or transparent (cf. 
Evers 2014: 295-96). 
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5.2. Two Metasemantic Options
Suppose  ought has roughly the above kind of descriptive semantics.  What kind of
metasemantic function might the practical role of ought play with respect to it? Its
practical role won’t explain any particular context-invariant features of its meaning,
such as why its meaning includes parameters for which worlds matter and how we
rank them. Two options seem to remain. One has to do with the metasemantics of
the context-sensitivity of  ought. Perhaps its practical role contributes to explaining
its  semantic  value  specifically  in  its  committal  uses.  The  other  option  is  quite
different. Perhaps the practical role of  ought instead plays some significant role in
explaining why a given formal semantics is an appropriate model for  ought in the
first place. 
The first  view is  initially  attractive.  It  promises  to  solve  the  Problem of
Diverse Uses. Whether a use is committal or not is a difference in context. We might
then think that when ought is used in a committal way, this can make a difference to
the values of its contextual parameters. In this way, the practical role of ought might
contribute to explaining its semantic value in some cases but not others. To assess
this, it is important to see that the modal rule makes no semantic difference between
committal  and  non-committal  uses  of  ought.  Nothing  in  the  standard  semantics
requires the contextually supplied ordering sources or modal bases to be such that
the  results  of  feeding  them  into  the  modal  rule  for  ought align  with  anyone’s
practical commitments.27 In non-committal uses, the values of contextual parameters
are  fixed  by factors  other  than  practical  commitments.  Even  in  committal  uses,
27 One might claim that such a requirement can be motivated as an external constraint on the 
semantics. Things can be ranked in terms of badness rather than goodness. Formally speaking 
such a ranking is eligible to help determine the semantic value of ought in certain contexts. But 
could there really be a context in which a competent speaker who says that we ought to do 
something is thereby asserting that it is what we do in all the maximally bad worlds compatible 
with the modal base? If not, our overall semantic theory should posit a restriction on what 
rankings can supply the ordering source. One might then suggest that such a restriction has 
something to do with the relation between these rankings and the practical commitments of some 
contextually determined agent. In response, let’s consider again Iago who is committed to sheer 
malignity for its own sake. Sincerely uttering ‘You ought to kill, and it is better if you kill than if 
you study’ is morally misguided and perhaps for that reason uncommon. But it needn’t be 
linguistically incoherent if the ordering source is the same. (The sentence is true if killing is 
ranked highly by the contextually selected ordering source, and false if not.) By contrast, ‘You 
ought to kill, but it is better if you study than if you kill’ is incoherent if the ordering source is the
same. Various semantic connections between between good and ought constrain their 
interpretations (Lassiter 2017: ch. 8) independently of the practical roles of these terms. So 
explaining why ought-claims rarely assert what is done in maximally bad worlds doesn’t require 
invoking the practical role of ought even in committal uses. It cannot require that in non-
committal uses anyway.
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appeal to practical role shouldn’t single out any specific standard to be fed into our
formal  semantics.  Often  the  selection  of  an  ordering  source  is  a  substantive
normative matter, at least beyond specifications such as ‘the correct standards’ or
‘the  most  fundamental  standards’.  By  the  same  token,  however,  nothing  in  the
standard  semantics rules  out that  contextually  relevant  motivations  or  practical
commitments may contribute to fixing the semantic value of  ought  in committal
contexts. So do they?
If you think that  the practical role of  normative language sets it  apart from
non-normative language in some broadly semantic way, you’ll want its practical role
to be a distinctive and comparatively significant feature of its meaning. Locating the
difference in the metasemantics of context-sensitivity fails to fulfill  this promise.
The  problem  arises  from perfectly  general  considerations.  What  is  required  for
interpreting  utterances  featuring  context-sensitive  terms? A variety  of  contextual
inputs  must  combine  to  set  the  values  of  contextual  parameters  and  thereby
transform non-propositional semantic values into compositional semantic values that
are truth-apt. This may be fairly straightforward for simple demonstratives like this,
or even conventionalized for indexicals like  I  and now. In general, however,  just
which contextual  factors  can contribute to  determining the semantic  value of  an
expression and how they may combine to do so defies simple generalization. Factors
that are in general eligible are many. They include common presuppositions, social
influences,  the  structure  of  the  preceding  discourse,  salient  objects,  and  more
(Glanzberg 2007). The metasemantics of the ordering source parameter for ought is
indirect in the same way: multiple factors influence how its value is set in context.28
That  must  be  so  since  in  non-committal  uses  the  semantic  value  of  ought is
determined by  factors other than its practical role anyway. Suppose we have been
discussing  capitalism  and  I  say ‘We ought  to  prioritize  profit  over  workers’
interests’.  It  may well  be clear from the preceding discourse,  or the pins on my
jacket,  that  I’m a  committed  critic  of  capitalism.  I  should  then  be  construed  as
talking about what follows from capitalist values.
If factors other than the practical role of ought suffice to determine semantic
value  in  non-committal  contexts,  we  can  expect  them  sometimes  to  override
contextually relevant practical commitments even in committal contexts. In general,
28 On indirect metasemantics in general, see Glanzberg (2007, 2020). King (2014) defends a 
metasemantics on which the values of contextual parameters are fixed by speakers’ intentions. 
But even on that view, it is a substantial issue whether or when the ordering source parameter is 
fixed by practical commitments. 
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different factors may pull in different directions and, thus, require balancing. For
instance, social influences and speaker intentions may conflict. No particular factor
enters  such  a  calculation  from  a  position  of  privilege,  unless  the  conventional
meaning  of  the  expression  in  question  so  dictates.  But  we  have  seen  that  the
practical role of  ought isn’t part of its conventional meaning, nor is its presence
marked otherwise by linguistic convention. So when practical commitments help us
to limit the set of contextually relevant ordering sources in some way, any other way
of limiting them in that way would have done just as well. Thus, even when the
practical role of ought plays an indirect metasemantic role, it plays no distinctive or
comparatively significant role in determining the semantic value of ought.29 So the
claim that  the  practical  role  of  thin normative terms is  a  particularly  significant
feature of their meaning cannot be vindicated in the metasemantics of their context-
sensitivity.30 My reasons for this claim may not be conclusive. The issues here are
subtle  and  the  metasemantics  of  context-sensitivity  is  an  underexplored  topic  in
general. But the reasons look strong enough to recommend looking elsewhere.
The second  metasemantic view is that the practical role of  ought  is part of
what explains why the dominant sort of formal models for modal language provide a
good descriptive semantics for terms like  ought in the first place. For instance, an
inferentialist metasemantics might hold (roughly) that a given formal semantics is a
good model for ought because it explicates a certain kind of inferential structure in
which  ought  is nested (Chrisman 2015; Tiefensee 2019,  2021). Or, metasemantic
expressivism might hold (again, roughly) that a given formal semantics is a good
model for ought because it appropriately mirrors the structure of mental states which
ought expresses (Ridge 2014; Köhler 2018). 
If the association between thin normative terms and practical role is to be
metasemantic in this  way, a further claim is required.  The explanation of why a
certain  formal  semantics  is  a  good  model  for  ought must  invoke  specifically
practical inferences or motivational states. But, on the face of it, an explanation that
unifies  the committal  and non-committal  uses of  ought doesn’t  need this  further
claim.31 The standard semantics implies that committal and non-committal uses of
29 Practical upshots can also play an indirect metasemantic role even if they are heterogeneous 
across contexts in ways that wouldn’t support explanatory generalizations.  
30 In §6.1 I’ll suggest that pragmatic accounts of the practical role of ought can accommodate the 
above kind of weak and indirect metasemantic role.  
31 Silk’s (2016) general framework for theorizing about normative language looks compatible with 
this alternative. Silk proposes that “normative uses” of ought present the speaker as endorsing the
standards that justify the ought-claim in question (2016: 130-132, 137). Justification is an 
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any deontic sentence of the form Ought(p) have the same semantic value when the
modal base and the ordering source are the same. Explaining non-committal uses
only requires invoking theoretical commitments and cognitive states. By parity, that
should suffice also for explaining committal uses. The standard semantics doesn’t
care about this distinction between uses. So, on the face of it, explaining why it is a
good model for  ought shouldn’t require invoking practical role. If that is right, it
would complete my case that nothing in the standard semantics for ought supports
treating those  uses  which are  associated  with a  practical  role  as  semantically  or
metasemantically exceptional. I’ll now argue that existing forms of metasemantic
inferentialism and expressivism don’t support assigning the practical role of ought a
significant metasemantic function of this type. The Problem of Diverse Uses still
pushes us not to build the practical role of thin normative terms into our overall
semantic theory for these expressions. 
5.3. Ideational Expressivism
First  consider  “ideational  expressivism” due to  Ridge.  Ideationalism is  a general
metasemantic  theory  according  to  which  “facts  about  the  semantic  contents  of
meaningful items in natural languages are constituted by facts about how those items
are conventionally used to express states of mind” (Ridge 2014: 107). What Ridge’s
expressivism adds to this general framework is the claim that normative sentences
have their meaning in virtue of expressing a certain kind of non-representational,
motivational  states  while  descriptive  sentences  have  their  meaning  in  virtue  of
expressing representational states (Ridge 2014: 110-11). My discussion won’t touch
ideational expressivism in its most general form, but only those specific forms that
assign significant metasemantic work to the practical role of normative terms. 
To illustrate, consider Ridge’s broadly Kratzer-style descriptive semantics,
on which any use of  ought/must says  roughly something of  the following form:
“Any standard of contextually  specified kind S would,  relative to a contextually
specified set of background information or facts B, recommend/require X” (Ridge
2014: 28). Formally normative standards, such as legal standards, have no essential
link to a practical role. But some standards do. If a sentence like ‘You ought to give
intranormative notion, and endorsement (which Silk usually applies to endorsing a body of 
information) doesn’t entail affirming specifically practical commitments. Nor is that entailed by 
his account of normative uses as presupposing a set of standards endorsed in the context, 
analyzed as a contextual parameter whose value speakers can manage by exploiting their mutual 
grammatical and world knowledge and general pragmatic reasoning skills (Silk 2016: 131, 145).
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to charity’ is used to make an “all things considered practically normative” claim, it
can be paraphrased as “Any acceptable standard of practical reasoning would, given
contextually specified circumstances, recommend that you give to charity” (Ridge
2014: 40). Normative contexts are to be understood narrowly as those in which the
relevant sort of standard is ‘any acceptable standard of practical reasoning’.32 In such
contexts, Ridge claims, ought and must express a certain kind of motivational states
(Ridge 2014: 19-21). In other contexts, ought and must are used non-normatively. 
So Ridge acknowledges that terms like  ought can be put to diverse uses.
However, using ideational expressivism to explain why the standard semantics is a
good model for ought requires no reference to the practical role of ought. No such
reference is required for non-committal uses of ought to state recommendations.  A
further good question is whether one can use  ought non-committally to state what
would be recommended by any acceptable standard of practical reasoning.33 (Why
not?)  To  assess  ought-sentences  that  count  as  normative  under  Ridge’s  narrow
definition, consider his preferred account of expression:
Accountability Expression: A declarative sentence ‘p’ in sense S in
a  natural  language  N used with  assertive  force  in  a  context  of
utterance C expresses a state of mind M if and only if conventions
which partially constitute N dictate that someone who says ‘p’ in
sense S in C with assertive force is thereby liable for being in state
M. (Ridge 2014: 109.)
Whether  an  assertive  use  of  ought states  what  would  be  recommended  by  any
acceptable standard of practical reasoning is a function of features of the context of
utterance  which  don’t  normally  ground  linguistic  convention.34 So  the  relevant
32 A standard of practical reasoning is a standard which is treated by the agent as a standard of 
practical reasoning and which can function in a certain action-guiding way (Ridge 2014: 40).
33 According to Ridge, to decide that a course of action is acceptable in a given set of circumstances
is “in some sense to decide that the course of action is not ruled out for purposes of your 
deliberation – that it is still ‘on the table’” (Ridge 2014: 41). Note that some non-committal uses 
of ought may satisfy this description. In (5), for instance, the speaker isn’t (yet) engaged in 
deliberation but treats going shopping as being still on the table. 
34 Ridge notes that we can use modifiers like really and genuine to flag that we are using ought or 
must in his narrowly normative sense. For instance, we can acknowledge that etiquette requires 
something but query whether that is what we really ought to do or have any genuine reason to do 
(Ridge 2014: 20). But this effect of really/genuine may be better explained in the pragmatics. It 
this tells us nothing much about the meanings of assertive utterances of ought-sentences without 
such modifiers. Nor is a narrowly normative meaning of ‘really ought to’ a function of semantic 
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linguistic conventions would have to enter someplace else. Ridge does allude to “a
theory  of  how  the  linguistic  conventions  provide  a  function  from  contexts  of
utterance to states of mind for any given sentence of the language” (2014: 130). But
what are the linguistic conventions of English which dictate that assertive utterances
of sentences of the form  Ought(p) to state what would be recommended by any
acceptable standard of practical reasoning make the speaker liable to be, specifically,
in a motivational state? We saw in §5.2 that they won’t be conventions pertaining to
how semantic value relative to context is computed from context as an operation on
the modal rule for ought.35 A more general point can be made even in the absence of
the kind of general theory to which Ridge alludes. Whether ideational expressivism
explains why the standard semantics is a good model for  ought doesn’t depend on
there  being  conventions  that  map  the  relevant  uses  of  ought  specifically  onto
motivational states. It is hard to see what conventions of English should rule out
accounting for assertions concerning what would be recommended by acceptable
standards of practical reasoning in terms of non-motivational states of mind, such as
beliefs  about  what  such standards  recommend.  In this  vicinity  lie  also good but
composition. What genuine and really contribute to composition in these contexts is the same as 
when we ask whether refraining from noting a smudge on someone’s face is genuinely a polite 
thing to do, or whether going on a bar crawl against my parents’ wishes is really a fun thing to 
do. 
35 Ridge’s own view may be more like the view that the practical role of ought does work in the 
metasemantics of its context-sensitivity. In the main text I discuss the prospects of recruiting his 
view to a different service, and so am not attributing all of the moves I discuss to Ridge himself. 
But ideational expressivism faces trouble also with showing that the practical role of ought plays 
a special role in explaining semantic value relative to context. Ridge individuates orderings 
finely: “A moral standard provides a different ordering from a legal standard, even in the case in 
which the law requires all and only the morally required actions” (Ridge 2014: 36). Consider two
speakers who both assert the same ought-sentence, such as ‘One ought to report one’s liability’. 
The contextually specified standards may be isomorphic in the orderings they induce but such 
that one speaker treats the standard as an acceptable standard of practical reasoning whereas the 
other doesn’t. (Two speakers can differ in this way with respect to moral standards, legal 
standards, and more.) Ridge’s view implies that the contexts involve different standards, so the 
two utterances have distinct semantic values. That may be fine if the contexts are separate, 
though I myself find it odd if solely a difference in the motivational states which the speakers are 
liable to be in implies that they say different things. But suppose the speakers are involved in a 
conversation. It would be implausible to posit constant context shifts depending on whether the 
speaker at the time treats a specific standard as an acceptable standard of practical reasoning. 
Modeling such a conversation requires just a shared conception of what actions are 
recommended and a way of tracking what the speakers are planning to do about that. Moreover, it
should be possible to report the conversation by saying ‘Timmy and Tammy both think that one 
ought to report one’s liability. Tammy is planning to report hers; Timmy isn’t.’ If their utterances 
said different things, such a report should be either false or odd. But it is an accurate report that 
would be felicitous in the described context.
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underexplored questions about how philosophically committal we should want our
metasemantic theories to be. 
Given Accountability Expression, a sentence can express M without its being
the case that the speaker actually is in M. One might then reply that ought-sentences
have the semantic  values  they have in  virtue  of  expressing  the  relevant  kind  of
motivational attitudes in all contexts. What happens in non-committal uses is that
further  contextual  information  implies  that  the  speaker’s  state  of  mind  doesn’t
exemplify  that  structure.  But  this  reply  is  problematic.  First,  Accountability
Expression doesn’t support it. In §4 we saw some reason to think that the liabilities
incurred by non-committal uses of ought aren’t plausibly parasitic on those incurred
by its committal uses. We still have no evidence that a parasitic relation holds in
such a way that non-committal speakers are liable to be in a motivational state by
linguistic  convention. So far as the conventions that constitute English go, deontic
assertions can well uniformly express states representing what verdicts follow from
contextually specified standards. Second, the standard semantics treats deontic talk
as expressing what requirements follow from such standards. Nothing in it suggests
that  this  semantic  function  of  deontic  talk  is  somehow parasitic  on  some more
immediately practical function.36 Explaining why it is a good model for ought thus
doesn’t  require  invoking  the  practical  role  of  ought.  I  conclude  that  ideational
expressivism doesn’t help broadly semantic views to  solve the Problem of Diverse
Uses.
5.4. Inferentialist Metasemantics
Now turn to inferentialist metasemantics for normative language.  Chrisman takes
the  truth-conditions  predicted  by  the  Kratzer-style  modal  rule  to  articulate  how
speakers  “have  to  think  and  reason  in  order  to  satisfy  the  implicit  conceptual
commitments affirmed by using ‘ought’ to make an assertion in ordinary discursive
practice” (Chrisman 2018:  415; cf.  Chrisman 2015: ch.  5).  My discussion won’t
touch metasemantic inferentialism in this general form, but only those specific forms
that assign significant metasemantic work to the practical role of normative terms. 
36 Ridge suggests that normative discourse might be like imperatival discourse, in that although 
imperatives can serve subsidiary communicative functions, these are “somehow parasitic on the 
more immediately practical function of the imperative form” (Ridge 2014: 21). Here I question 
the parallel. See also note 15 for the possibility that the practical function of the imperative form 
is a kind of pragmatic phenomenon. 
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Existing inferentialist metasemantics for normative language take this form.
Chrisman acknowledges that some uses of ought merely commit one to concluding
the  verdicts  of  the  contextually  selected  ranking.  But  he  proposes  that  the
commitments  affirmed  by  “genuinely  normative”  uses  could  “be  conceived  as
commitments to reason practically in certain ways” (Chrisman 2018: 416). The key
idea is that the general metasemantic function of ought is still the same across these
local differences. Tiefensee similarly proposes to understand evaluative terms such
as good in terms of a general metaconceptual function of structuring and explaining
the legitimacy of certain language exit transitions to intentions, actions, and so on
(Tiefensee  2021).37 Transposed to the deontic key of this paper, this is to analyze
ought as  a  linguistic  instrument  for  explicating  certain  commitment  structures.
Asserting ‘I ought to help my sister’, for instance, explains why a commitment to a
premise like ‘Babysitting the boys will help my sister’ provides a reason to enter into
the commitment that I shall babysit the boys, and likewise for premises concerning
what one has promised, and so on (cf. Tiefensee 2021: 122, 125). 
These views acknowledge that  terms like  ought can be put  to diverse uses.
But they, too, struggle with the Problem of Diverse Uses. Recall that on the standard
semantics, an ought-sentence will have the same truth-conditions across committal
and non-committal uses when contexts supply the same modal base and ordering
source.  ‘We  ought  to  report  our  liability’,  for  instance,  says  that  reporting  our
liability ranks highly on the contextually determined standard.  On the face of it,
explaining why the standard semantics is a good model for (deontic)  ought should
then be insensitive to differences in practical upshot. Metasemantic inferentialism
would be more general and unified if  it  modeled  ought as  explicating structures
whose language exit transitions consist in theoretical commitments. Examples would
be commitments to form certain beliefs about what is required or recommended and
to recognize reasons for action which correspond to the same ordering source.38 This
would account for one  central function of deontic vocabulary of English: stating
what requirements or recommendations follow from various sorts of standards to
37 For reasons of space, I simplify a great deal. I bracket Tiefensee’s (2021) view that we need to 
begin with words like good because ought presupposes evaluative orderings. As far as I can see 
myself, an ordering needn’t itself have evaluative content, and only a notion of ranking highly on
an ordering (rather than, e.g., being among the best in any evaluatively laden sense) is required 
for identifying the set of recommended items.
38 Contrary to what Tiefensee (2016: 2444) seems to suggest, it isn’t sufficient for practical 
commitment in the relevant sense that a claim of the form ‘I ought to φ’ gives a pro tanto 
justification or reason to φ. Recall note 7.
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which  the  interlocutors  needn’t  be  practically  committed.  Its  further  function  to
convey practical commitments could well figure in some other part of our overall
theory of meaningful communication, such as pragmatics.39
For metasemantic inferentialism to solve the Problem of Diverse Uses, one
of two different views must instead be true. One is the view that Chrisman gestures
at:  committal  and  non-committal  uses  of  ought explicate  different  commitment
structures;  those involved in committal  uses feature not only theoretical but also
practical  commitments.  The  other  is  the  view  that  they  explicate  the  same
commitment  structures  and  these  are  indispensably  practical.  Anyone  making  a
deontic  assertion  using  ought would  normally  be  understood  as  undertaking  the
commitments which the sentence makes explicit, but further contextual information
may suggest that the speaker’s assertion only reports that structure. However, neither
view explains why the standard semantics is  a good model  for  ought.  Nor does
either view support the distinct view that the practical role of ought constrains our
overall semantic theory in some other way. 
If practical commitments were indispensable to the commitment structures
which ought explicates or affirms, the opposite thesis should fall to a reductio. But it
doesn’t. Suppose that the language exit moves in the commitment structures which
deontic  ought makes explicit  consist wholly in theoretical commitments.  Deontic
ought-claims would then make the same kind of commitment structure explicit in
both committal and non-committal uses, and language exits would still be to states
that  are  about  actions.  This variant of metasemantic inferentialism could equally
well  say that anyone making a deontic assertion using  ought would normally be
understood as undertaking the commitments which the sentence makes explicit, but
further contextual information may suggest that the speaker’s assertion only reports
that structure. For it is perfectly compatible with all of the above that speakers who
assert  ought-sentences  would normally be understood,  on the basis  of  pragmatic
inferences, as  undertaking  also some  practical  commitments.  So  the  appeal  to
practical commitments doesn’t seem indispensable in explaining why the standard
semantics is a good model for ought. 
39 Note a related issue about the metasemantic adequacy of versions of inferentialism which appeal 
to indispensably practical commitment structures. If modal expressions are polysemous across 
different “flavors” of modality, the polysemy doesn’t seem to arise from differences in 
commitment structures. The arguments for modal polysemy in Viebahn and Vetter (2016) aren’t 
like that, for instance. 
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This  leaves  the  view  that  committal  and  non-committal  uses  of  ought
explicate different commitment structures. For this to solve the Problem of Diverse
Uses,  the  distinction  between  committal  and  non-committal  uses  of  normative
language  must  be  semantically  significant.  Chrisman  suggests  that  “genuinely
normative” uses of ought differ conceptually from the rest. In some sense that must
be right, since there is a distinction between committal and non-committal uses to be
drawn. But this minimal sense isn’t enough here. We have seen that the distinction
isn’t lexically encoded or  marked by linguistic convention. We have also seen that
prospects are poor for showing that non-committal uses of normative language are
semantically  parasitic  on  some  more  immediate  practical  function  of  normative
language. Nor have we been shown any other evidence that the distinction plays a
role in explaining why the standard semantics is a good model for ought. As we have
seen, if a word can be used in certain contexts to affirm or explicate certain implicit
conceptual commitments, this isn’t automatically something to be reflected in our
overall  semantic  theory.  So  even  if  inferentialism  explains  why  the  standard
semantics provides a good model for terms like ought, we have yet to see why that
explanation  must  feature  not  only  theoretical  but  also  practical  commitments.
Differences between committal and non-committal uses might instead be captured in
some other part of our overall theory of meaningful communication.
 Time to conclude. In this section I introduced the dominant sort of formal
semantics for  deontic modal expressions like  ought. I then argued that explaining
why deontic  ought has this kind of descriptive semantics doesn’t require appeal to
the practical role it plays in many contexts. My argument went through all the places
I can think of where practical role might show up: the metasemantics of the context-
invariant semantic features of  ought;  the metasemantics of its context-sensitivity;
and explaining why a given kind of formal semantics is in general a good model for
ought. Existing expressivist and inferentialist metasemantics for normative language
don’t support the claim that the practical role of such language is a distinctive and
particularly significant feature of its meaning. And yet metasemantics seemed to be
the most promising place for vindicating broadly semantic accounts of the practical
role of thin normative terms. I cannot claim to have conclusively ruled out that the
practical role of normative language is a metasemantic phenomenon. Caution is due:
the issues here are subtle  and underexplored  and my argument has many moving
parts. But at minimum my argument sets a demanding bar to be met. 
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6. Broader Implications
I’ll close by discussing the prospects of explaining the practical role of normative
language in pragmatic rather than broadly semantic terms and highlighting some
broader implications of my negative argument for metaethics and the philosophy of
normativity. 
6.1. Looking Ahead to Pragmatics
The challenges that I have raised against broadly semantic accounts of the practical
role of thin normative terms bite because  generalizations  which don’t rise to full
generality are normally more apt to be explained in the pragmatics. Explanations of
linguistic phenomena that appeal to general principles of communication instead of
special theoretical posits are more unified and parsimonious. So if a phenomenon
can be explained in the pragmatics, then (all else equal) it shouldn’t be explained
semantically.  The obvious follow-up question is whether  the practical role of thin
normative  terms  can  be  adequately  explained  as  a  pragmatic  phenomenon.  If  it
couldn’t,  that would support  introducing suitable posits into our overall semantic
theory. 
The general character of pragmatic reasoning concerns what can be inferred
from  the  following  sort  of  premise:  the  speaker  believed  that  uttering  a  given
particular sentence in the given context was best for promoting her conversational
ends. Determining whether the practical role of normative  speech can be derived
through broadly pragmatic reasoning thus requires answering the following sorts of
questions:  In  pursuit  of  what  conversational  ends  may  we  engage  in  normative
speech? By means of what kind of normative speech do we take those ends to be
best achieved? Answering these questions is well beyond the scope of this paper. But
there is reason to be optimistic about a pragmatic account.  Everyone will need an
account of what makes particular  uses  of words normative. A very wide range of
non-normative terms can be contingently associated with practical upshots, given a
suitable context. For instance, saying that a knife is sharp can convey a disposition
or commitment to use it when it is common ground that a hard loaf of bread needs
slicing. Any association between uttering ‘This knife is sharp’ and such practical
upshots is pragmatic. Plenty theoretical space thus exists for a pragmatic account of
the practical role of normative language. 
27
One possibility is to adapt the pragmatic account from Finlay (2014: ch. 5).
Finlay develops a certain kind of “end-relational” semantics of normative terms. He
then argues that we can predict and explain the practicality of normative talk as a
feature of “how we use normative language in context, pursuing our desired ends”
by using “only maximally simple and conservative principles of pragmatics” (Finlay
2014: 116). The broad kind of pragmatic story might well be similar regardless of
whether the relevant inputs from context are ends, rankings, or whatnot.  Here is
another  possibility.  Suppose  we  are  particularly  concerned  to  explain  why  we
normally don’t need to work it out from scratch why the speaker of a bare first-
person normative utterance is committed to acting or reacting accordingly. Here we
might be able to adapt accounts which treat certain features of normative discourse
as  “generalized”  pragmatic  features.  When a  pragmatic  feature  is  generalized,  it
arises from saying a certain thing in the absence of conversational moves or other
special circumstances that would revoke the implication.40 Strandberg (2012) argues
that the motivational implications of moral assertions are generalized conversational
implicatures.  Väyrynen  (2013:  ch.  5)  argues  that  the  evaluative  implications  of
“thick” terms, such as chaste and generous, are default but defeasible “not-at-issue
contents”  of  their  assertive  uses  in  normal  contexts.  The  practical  upshots  with
which thin normative termsare associated might be susceptible to one of these types
of explanation.  
A fuller pragmatic account of the practical role of thin normative terms is
beyond the scope of this paper. But another optimistic note worth sounding is that
the practical role of thin normative terms can both be a pragmatic phenomenon and
play  the kind of indirect  metasemantic  role  described in  §5.2.  Suppose someone
makes a claim about what we ought to do but you don’t immediately get just what
they  are  saying.  One  way  you  can  try  to  understand  them  is  by  searching  for
practical  commitments  that  would  make  sense  of  the  utterance.  For  instance,
information about the speaker’s or another  salient agent’s  practical commitments
might  help  to  identify standards which would recommend the action in question.41
(Other ways include a closer look at the preceding discourse, and so on. Recall the
discussion of indirect metasemantics of context-sensitivity in §5.2.) Speakers often
can expect their audience to interpret their utterances in this way by exploiting their
40 Here I generalize Grice’s notion of generalized conversational implicature (Grice 1989: 37-38).
41 See Silk (2016: 126-32) for one more detailed discussion of these kinds of aspects of normative 
discourse.
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grammatical  knowledge  (that  ought requires  a  ranking,  and  so  on),  world
knowledge,  and  general  pragmatic  reasoning  skills.  The  general  point  is  that  a
context-sensitive expression with an indirect metasemantics may well be such that a
factor can help fix the value of a contextual parameter in a context of its utterance
and yet get communicated by the utterance as a matter of pragmatics. My arguments
suggest that contextually relevant practical commitments may be one such thing. 
6.2. Implications for Metaethics and the Philosophy of Normativity
If my negative arguments against broadly semantic accounts of the practical role of
normative language are on the right track, they put significant pressure on a range of
prominent accounts of normative language. As my discussions of Hare, Blackburn,
Gibbard,  and  Ridge  suggest,  they  put  pressure  on  expressivist  accounts  of  the
meaning of normative language in terms of plans or other conative states.42 As my
discussions  of  Wedgwood,  Chrisman,  and  Tiefensee  suggest,  they  put  similar
pressure on versions of conceptual or inferential role theories which aim to explain
the meaning of normative language in terms of its practical role. These arguments
also challenge the motivation for those moral error theories according to which it is
a non-negotiable commitment of our moral discourse that  such discourse plays a
certain kind of practical role. 
My negative arguments also show that we need to be much more careful in
moving between claims about normative thought and claims about normative talk.
To be clear, the arguments are compatible with there being normative concepts to
which a practical role is essential. There are downstream questions, such as how we
might  manage  to  express  such  concepts  if  expressing  them isn’t  a  semantic  or
metasemantic feature of normative language. But the immediate lesson is just that
even if there are  OUGHT-concepts which are conceptually linked to motivation or
practical commitment, this link is reflected neither in our descriptive semantics nor
our metasemantics for the  corresponding segment of English.  Normative discourse
can then  be in perfectly good working order without predicates that are associated
with  certain  practical  roles  in  any  broadly  semantic  way.  This  doesn’t  seem
descriptively inadequate.  For instance,  my arguments raise no deep problems for
explaining why ought is characteristically used to offer advice, must to issue more
42 Some recent work interprets expressivism more broadly as a view on which states of mind are 
fundamental in a theory of meaning (cf. Ridge 2014; Charlow 2015; Silk 2016). As emphasized 
in §5.3, my arguments touch such views only insofar as they appeal to essentially practically 
oriented states of mind. 
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insistent sort of requirements and orders, and so on. If their characteristic semantic
function  is  to  describe  recommendations  or  requirements  that  follow from some
assumed ranking, they will be naturally suited for directive conversational effects. 
How my arguments bear on the philosophy of normativity is more complex.
Some deny that discussions of how normative terms work in natural language are of
much  import  to  philosophers  of  normativity.  For  example,  Broome  argues  that
philosophers  of normativity  “do not  have to  be much bothered by the fluid and
contextual nature of ‘ought’ in common English” (Broome 2016: 10). There is a
central practical meaning of  ought, specified by an “enkratic” rational requirement
on  intentions.  The  philosophy  of  normativity  is  principally  concerned  with  the
metaphysical nature of this ought, what determines when it obtains, and so on. 
I won’t here discuss whether Broome is right that the enkratic  OUGHT is at
the centre of normativity. The main lesson of my paper is that even if a given OUGHT
is privileged with respect to the philosophy of normativity, it won’t be linguistically
privileged. For example, even when ought is used to express an authoritative OUGHT
which resolves conflicts between explicitly relativized notions  like  “moral ought”
and “prudential ought” and specifies what we ought to do without qualification, that
is just a special case of the standard semantics. For it to be a well-behaved use of
ought, it must induce a ranking of the things that matter in the context. (Broome
2016: 10 allows that there may be such a “final ordering”.) We might not have a
dedicated name for such a ranking. But if there wasn’t one, this OUGHT wouldn’t be
able to resolve conflicts between various explicitly relativized oughts. Regarding the
enkratic OUGHT, it wouldn’t be clear why rationality should require that you intend
to do what you judge you ought to do (in  this sense) unless  it was something that
mattered highly in the context.   
We probably  won’t  be  able  to  say  much  at  all  about  the  content  of  the
ranking induced by any such privileged OUGHT without doing substantive normative
theory. But that is as it should be. We shouldn’t expect semantic theory to tell us
much about normative theory. Nor, however, should normative theory do all that
much to shape or drive semantic theory. So I counsel caution and reconciliation.
Even if philosophers of normativity have identified a specific concept which lies at
the centre of normativity and can be expressed by ought, this implies little regarding
how its practical role is reflected in language. Even if a given OUGHT is individuated
by  a  practical  role  that  involves distinctive  conceptual  commitments,  it  doesn’t
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follow that those commitments are to be reflected in our overall semantic theory.
Just  as  semanticists  should  avoid  exaggerated  claims  about  normativity,
philosophers of normativity should be sensitive to how the core features of their
central concepts are reflected in language.43
43 This paper was four years in the making, which feels long for something that began as a fun side 
project and remained a side project. My bumbling early runs at its core argument probably count 
as a distinct paper even by a fairly coarse-grained individuation of philosophy papers. That 
predecessor (“Evaluative Terms and Normative Role”) received valuable feedback from 
audiences at University of Leeds, University of Geneva, Uppsala University, Humboldt 
University of Berlin, and the New York Philosophy of Language Workshop. Something more like
the present paper was helped along by discussions at University of Cambridge and workshops at 
NYU Abu Dhabi and Frankfurt School of Finance and Management. I’m grateful to Alex King as
my commentator in Abu Dhabi and to Sarah Buss, Matti Eklund, Will Gamester, Camil Golub, 
Matthew Kramer, Nick Laskowski, Tristram McPherson, Eliot Michaelson, Christine Tiefensee, 
Robbie Williams, and Jack Woods for conversations and/or comments on various versions of the 
material. Comments from anonymous referees for JESP and many other journals along the way 
also led to significant improvements. Many thanks to you all. 
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